[Is the principlist model still satisfactory for the analysis of the morality of the scientific research involving human beings?].
This paper discusses the application of principlism to research involving human subjects, starting from the question of its pertinence in the current situation of the paradigmatic pluralization on science and the multiplication of models of ethical evaluation in the complex societies. Highlights that the development of modern scientific medicine depended strongly on human experimentation and that up to the mid 20th century the good intention of the researcher was, theoretically, enough to justify a research morally, but that with the twofold paradigmatic transition in Science and in Ethics, occurred in the course of the 20th century, a pluralization and complexification took form in both the scientific know-how and the field of ethics applied to scientific research, which on normative level was in the uncomfortable situation of having to deal with a permanent contestation of scientific and ethic paradigms. In the field of ethics, other principles also pass to guide decisions such as the principles of protection, applicable to situations of need as they arise mainly in the case of the populations of the Third World. Finally, principlism is pertinent in its general philosophic posture and methodological value, but insufficient when applied to the moral problems of public health and in particular to research ethics in dependent countries.